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Judaism's Religious Vision and the Capitalist Ethic

***Rabbi Professor Jonathan Sacks** has been Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the British Commonwealth since September 1, 1991. At the time of his appointment, he was Principal of Jews' College, London, the world's oldest rabbinical seminary. The Chief Rabbi is a frequent contributor to radio, television, and the press, as well as the author of fourteen books, including, most recently,* A Letter in the Scroll *(Free Press/Simon and Schuster).*

***R&L:** Historically, what has been the influence of Judaism on the development of capitalism?*

Sacks: It is important to distinguish between Judaism as a faith and Jews as a people. Both have had an impact on the development of capitalism, in different ways. Judaism did so through its emphasis on work as virtue, made as a necessity, and private property as a precondition of individual liberty. Judaism did not share either the aristocratic disdain for work found in classical Greece or the occasional tendency to other-worldliness found in early Christianity. It saw this-worldly prosperity as a sign of God's blessing, and work as man's "partnership with God in the work of creation."

Jews, throughout the Middle Ages, were often barred from owning land or entering the professions. As a result, many of them were forced into trade and finance, partly because of the Christian prohibition against taking interest. The result was that Jews became pioneers in banking and finance, as well as in international trade. The cultural impact of Jewish values on the market economy of the West is discussed in David Landes's fascinating study, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations.*

***R&L:** To your way of thinking, what are the affinities between the ethical and theological precepts of Judaism and the structures of the free-market economy?*

Sacks: Judaism as a religious vision emphasizes the integrity, freedom, and independence of the individual, as well as his or her responsibilities to society. Individual property rights were therefore as important to the Hebrew Bible as they later were to John Locke. One of the great biblical dramas is Elijah's challenge to King Ahab, who seizes Naboth's vineyard (1 Kings 21). Kings did not have the right to appropriate private property. The prophet Micah dreamed of a day in which "every man will sit under his own vine and under his own fig tree and none will make him afraid" (Mic. 4:4). A world of limited government and respect for private property, in which individuals are self-supporting through their own labor, is a world of maximal freedom and human dignity. Judaism's strong provisions for *tzedakah* (a word meaning both charity and righteousness) are designed not only to alleviate poverty but also, and primarily, to restore independence. Hence, in Jewish law, the highest form of charity is to find someone a job so that he or she no longer needs to depend on charity.

***R&L:** You have argued that "socialism is not the only enemy of the market economy. Another enemy, all the more*

INSIDE THIS ISSUE **Articles:** "Faith, Freedom, and September 11" by Rev. Robert A. Sirico; "Should Christians Say 'Amen' to Religious Politics?" by Lucas E. Morel; and "A Different Kind of Enlightenment" by Ingrid A. Merikoski **Book Reviews:** Ken Masugi on *Christian Faith and Modern Democracy,* and Peter J. Hill on *Globalization and the Kingdom of God* **In the Liberal Tradition:** Wilhelm von Humboldt.

powerful for its recent global triumph, is the market economy itself." What do you mean by this?

Sacks: A sustainable market economy depends on certain values that are not created by the market—among them trust, integrity, honesty to customers, loyalty to employees, industry, reliability, and so on. Other values, no less important in the long run, are strong families, a passion for education, and a sense of responsibility to the community. The market encourages competition, but this needs to be balanced by habits of cooperation. As many writers have pointed out—among them, Joseph Schumpeter, Daniel Bell, and George Soros—in itself, the market tends to erode those values necessary to its own survival. The market is part, but not the whole, of a free society.

***R&L:** What kind of society do you think gives rise to and is able to sustain a free-market economy?*

Sacks: A free-market economy tends to be created where there is a strong respect for the individual, a positive value attached to work, and a willingness to value and reward creativity and innovation. It tends not to arise in social systems that are highly collectivist, aristocratic, or conservative.

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***R&L:** You have argued that, to thrive, morality needs to be anchored by tradition and, further, that the free market tends to destabilize traditional societies. Since the free market needs a moral foundation to remain humane, how can we avoid the free market destroying the very thing it needs to survive?*

Sacks: Almost every human civilization has had its periods of growth, maturity, and decline. The free market (and its political counterpart, liberal democracy) may be no exception. The single greatest innovation in Judaism was the Sabbath—one day in seven when the market was closed; there was no work; a limit was set on economic striving. This created a psychological and sociological balance within Jewish life, which saved it from collective burnout. That may be why Judaism—the faith of a tiny and often powerless people—survived, while the great empires did not.

***R&L:** I would like for us to explore some of the important ways in which rabbinical thought has contributed to moral reflection on commercial culture. What do you see as some of the rabbis' crucial insights on what we today would call business ethics?*

Sacks: A vast Jewish literature exists on business ethics, a subject of reflection for over three thousand years. It begins in the Mosaic books with such provisions as the fair and decent treatment of employees, honest weights and measures, and the periodic remission of debts to avoid the creation of a permanent underclass. It continues through the prophetic literature with Amos's and Isaiah's great denunciations of dishonesty and exploitation. These principles were developed in the rabbinic literature, which lays down detailed principles of fair trading, employee rights, honest advertising, unfair competition, and so on. A good summary is found in Meir Tamari's book, *With All Your Possessions: Jewish Ethics and Economic Life*.

***R&L:** Consumerism has become an important topic in contemporary debate. What is rabbinical thought's understanding of and solution for the moral peril of wealth?*

Sacks: In Judaism, wealth is seen as both a blessing and as a responsibility. The wealthy are expected to share their blessings with others and to be personal role models of social and communal responsibility: *Richesse oblige*. To a considerable extent, that is what happened in most Jewish communities at most times, and it is what saved Jews from the decadence associated with affluence. In Judaism, there is a difference between ownership and possession. What we have, we do not own; rather, we hold it as God's trustees. One of the con-

ditions of that trust is that we share what we possess with those in need. Wealth creation goes hand in hand with the alleviation of poverty—just as, in biblical times, landowners were expected to share part of their harvest with the poor. Jewish teaching is best summarized in the famous aphorism of Hillel: "If I am not for myself, who will be? But if I am only for myself, what am I?" Judaism is personal responsibility allied with social responsibility.

***R&L:** Similarly, what are the rabbis' teachings on poverty and its alleviation?*

Sacks: Poverty, for the rabbis, was a curse, with no saving graces. Poverty does not ennoble; it demeans. Therefore, the poor must be helped to escape from their poverty—through education, training, the creation of employment opportunities, and help in starting their own businesses.

In The Liberal Tradition

Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835)

"Governmental regulations all carry coercion to some degree, and even where they don't, they habituate man to expect teaching, guidance, and help outside himself, instead of formulating his own."

Described by Lord Acton as the "most central figure in Germany," Wilhelm von Humboldt began his public career in 1802 as the Prussian envoy to the papal court. He returned to Berlin in 1808 to accept his appointment as the Minister of Public Instruction. In this position, he became the architect of the Prussian educational system and the founder of the University of Berlin; he served in a variety of other governmental offices until his retirement from public service 1819.

While Humboldt's public career was distinguished, he made his greatest impact through his varied contributions to political philosophy, history, literature, and linguistics. (For example, his political ideas anticipated and were drawn upon by John Stuart Mill in his *On Liberty*.) Humboldt's expansive humanism is evident in the high value he placed on personal development in the free society.

In his *Limits of State Action,* Humboldt described his concept of the human person as a social animal striving for cultivation and improvement in the context and with the support of society. Humboldt, therefore, was opposed to large states, believing they impeded the full development of citizens. In his words, "Reason cannot desire for man any condition other than that in which not only every individual enjoys the most absolute, unbounded freedom to develop himself out of himself, in true individuality, but in which physical nature, as well, need receive no other shaping by human hands than that which is given to her voluntarily by each individual, according to the measure of his wants and his inclinations, restricted only by the limits of his energy and his rights."

In addition to this emphasis on the individuality of the human person, Humboldt maintained the person's necessary rootedness in society and community. This dual emphasis, according to one scholar, is Humboldt's unique contribution. Rather than seeing "the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, owing nothing for them," in which "the individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself," Humboldt manifested an "Aristotelian sense of the ways in which human beings enrich each other's lives in society, together with a quite non-Aristotelian sense that one can neither predict nor set limits to human moral and cultural experimentation."

Sources: The Limits of State Action *by Wilhelm von Humboldt (Liberty Fund, 1993), and* European Liberalism *edited by Massimo Salvadori (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972).*

R&L: *Is there a distinctive Judaic understanding of stewardship? What does that look like?*

Sacks: Stewardship in Judaism means that we are guardians of the world for the sake of future generations. We must not do irreparable environmental damage. We must create civic amenities. We must ensure that every child has the best possible education. We must provide our own children with the vocational training to become self-sufficient, and so on. An ancient rabbinic tradition teaches that, at the dawn of human history, God said to humankind, "See the beauty of the universe which I have created—and all that I created, I made for you. Be careful, therefore, that you do not harm what I have made, for if you do, there will be no one left to restore what you have destroyed."

R&L: *It has been said that more than the Jews having kept the Sabbath, the Sabbath has kept the Jews. How does the Judaic vision of Sabbath-keeping contribute to how one ought to view commercial activity in the free-market economy?*

Sacks: I had a friend who—well into his seventies—used to go for twenty or thirty mile walks. "What," I asked him, "is the secret of endurance?"

"Rest," he used to say, "five minutes in every hour."

Rest is the secret of survival, and the Sabbath is its greatest civilizational embodiment. The ancient Greeks did not understand the Sabbath. They thought that Jews ceased work one day in seven because they were lazy. They were quite wrong. The Sabbath is "re-creation": time dedicated to all those things that sustain a market economy but are endangered by it—family, community, celebration, prayer, study, and reflection. In a society that honors the Sabbath, people become the masters, not the slaves, of work. A society without a Sabbath is one in which we can be too busy making a living to have time to live. The first great principle of time management is to distinguish between the urgent and the important. The Sabbath is time dedicated to the things that are important but not urgent—spending time with one's spouse and children, sharing a meal, enjoying what we have instead of thinking what we do not have, and giving thanks to God for his blessings in the company of those with whom we share a faith.



Human freedom is expressed as much in the ability to stop as in the ability to work. The Sabbath is the great counterbalance that protects the market from self-destruction and ensures that wealth creation remains a means and not an end in itself.

Faith, Freedom, and September 11

Rev. Robert A. Sirico

How many times in the past months have we been struck by the expansive scope and seemingly endless depth of evil? In the midst of something so heinous, so diabolical, can the hand of the One whose finger is said to write straight with crooked lines be detected?

As the stories of the orphans and their grief are told and retold, whether in our national media or in our kitchens, there is lurking in each telling and retelling the ominous question underneath it all: Why?

Not that a simple and straightforward declaration from heaven itself would heal the wounds that we bear; yet the question of why evil exists is one that weighs heavy on many hearts these days.

No full answer, in the form of a sentence or a proposition, could ever satisfy the question, even if it were to drop from the sky. For the ultimate answer, which does come to us from heaven itself, comes not in the form of words, but of a Word, and more specifically, the Word that was made flesh. That final answer is not a proposition but a Person, and the embrace of One whose comfort is beyond our present understanding. The ultimate answer, then, is a mystery: the mystery of encounter and embrace.

But maintaining that the ultimate answer is a mystery does not mean that there are no proximate answers. Among the proximate answers is the fact that human freedom, so highly prized by all people, is also at the heart of evil. In a world whose history is frequently acquainted with totalitarian experiments, one would be tempted to think that freedom, standing alone, is its own good. Yet to see the heart of darkness as the world saw it on September 11, is to understand that mere men, for certain twisted reasons, chose to exercise their free will to destroy the freedom and lives of others.

Thus, freedom, as indispensable as it is, is not sufficient for constructing the quality of society and culture appropriate to man, his dignity, and his capacity. It must be freedom oriented to something beyond itself. As we have said so many times, freedom must be oriented to truth: the truth of man's origin, nature, and destiny.

That is why the Acton Institute was founded, and why its mission is to study and promote both the transcendental reality of man and his necessary freedom—or, as we put it, "religion and liberty" and "the free and virtuous society." A clear understanding of the proper relation between religion and society has never been as needed in our world as it is today.

The Love of Freedom, The Embrace of Faith

The events of September 11 have revealed a dimension about American society that some have attempted to shield from our view. We have discovered that, at its core, America is a profoundly religious nation and that faith is not a source of division between Americans but, rather, the foundation of our unity on shared principles.

In addition, Americans have discovered that when all of us, political leaders included, speak openly about our faith, it does not violate anyone's conscience, much less shred the Constitution, as so many pressure groups have argued in the past. Rather, such speech gives rise to reflection on America's highest and noblest aspirations. We have found that love of freedom and the embrace of faith are not incompatible; instead, they are bound up with one another, each reinforcing the other in harmony.

To that extent, we can hope that the last few months represent a sea change in how our society views the place of religion. There was not a public figure who addressed the attack on the United States without a plea for prayer for the victims. Many referred to the religious roots of the Western idea of human rights, one of the things so antithetical to the terrorists' concept of society. Many public spokesmen, including the president, sought God's blessing on our people and the aspirations of our nation. Prayer vigils have been continuous. Indeed, we cannot even imagine dealing with a crisis on this scale without our faith.

In a moving meditation days after the attack, President Bush expressed a vigorous faith: "As we've been assured: Neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, or height, nor depth can separate us from God's love. May he bless the souls of the departed, may he comfort our own, and may he always guide our country."

But I wonder. Had the president made these remarks one week earlier, would there have been an outcry, such as there was during the election when he shared his faith experience with some prayer groups? Might he have been called a theocrat, or worse? As it is, his unabashed faith, relentless during the presidential campaign, is now seen as a great sign of leadership. Indeed it is.

How tragic that it took a calamity on the scale of what we saw on September 11 to impart this message and reveal religious truth beneath secular pretensions. But there is even more going on here. As a nation, we have always grounded our belief in human rights in a fundamentally religious idea: Human life is sacred because it has an origin in the eternity of God's grace as well as a destiny in his love. It is because human beings are created in the image of God that we know that heinous acts of diabolical fanatics are crimes of such magnitude.

From the Declaration of Independence through the Civil Rights movement, faith has been at the core of every event of any magnitude. Usually, that faith is invoked in defense of the sanctity and dignity of the human person and against those who would violate it. This is as it should be.

A clear understanding of the proper relation between religion and society has never been as needed in our world as it is today.

— Rev. Robert A. Sirico

The Challenge of a Life of Faith

As for those who hate modern life, a way of life made possible by this vision of the human person, the choice of the World Trade Center, symbol of global free markets, was no accident. If one hates human life, one also hates the products of human creativity; hence, what better target could have been selected? And yet these terrorist attacks differ merely in kind and degree, not in principle, from the violent demonstrations and riots against globalization that we have witnessed in Seattle, Washington D.C., Montreal, and Geneva.

These are the irrational cries of the forces of repression and bondage that hate and fear liberty, human enterprise,

modernity, and, ultimately, human life itself. Thankfully, such forces are doomed to failure because the logic of their culture of death leads to self-immolation and destruction, whereas the logic of a rich and healthy culture of life leads to replenishment, creativity, and growth.

This, then, becomes the challenge of the post–September 11 world: Will we come to see our prosperity, creativity, and liberty as means to a higher end? Will the awareness of our transcendent reality form our day-to-day decisions and our path as a nation? And from the perspective of the Acton Institute—concerned as we are about cultivating a religious leadership that comprehends the moral potential of human liberty and enterprise—the critical question becomes, Are our clergy prepared to speak in such an intelligent, bold, and confident manner that they will invite our society to the spiritual and moral renaissance for which it so desperately yearns?

It is a commonly held view that faith is somehow not necessary in times of peace, prosperity, and security, that living in a society of plenty diminishes the longing for spiritual solace.

We know from our own experience that we are more likely to turn to God in difficult times than in easy ones. C. S. Lewis wrote that "God whispers to us in our pleasures, speaks in our conscience, but shouts in our pains: it is his megaphone to rouse a deaf world." It is when we reach the end of the rope, not when we feel ourselves to be masters of the universe, that we are most likely to fall on our knees in supplication. My pastoral experience suggests that a personal trial is a prime motivating source to seek spiritual comfort and the forgiveness of sins.

At the same time, it is an error—perhaps the fundamental error of the terrorists—to believe that faith and prosperity are always inversely related. Part of the challenge of living a life of faith is to maintain a certain spiritual equilibrium in good times as well as bad and not to be tossed about by the winds of circumstance, not flitting between bouts of depravity and sanctity but seeking devotion as a daily practice.

One can hope that there is no going back on our newfound tolerance for open expressions of faith. Let us hope that the abiding smirk has been permanently wiped off the faces of those cynical of faith and freedom, who have too long occupied a central place in our culture.

May we continue to regard faith as a source of strength, comfort, and blessing to us as individuals and as a nation, the source and summit of our freedom, its barometer and compass, even once our sense of security returns.

And let us all pray that it returns soon.

***Rev. Robert A. Sirico** is a Roman Catholic priest and the president of the Acton Institute. This essay is adapted from his address at the institute's eleventh annual dinner on October 11, 2001.*

Should Christians Say "Amen" to Religious Politics?

Lucas E. Morel

The events of September 11 have given rise to religious rhetoric in the public square the likes of which we have not seen in a long time. With Congressmen singing "God Bless America" on the Capitol steps and President Bush appealing to prayer, God, or the Bible in almost every speech, even the American Civil Liberties Union is observing a prolonged moment of silence. But what should Christians make of this political use of religion?

Back in 1992, many evangelicals grumbled when Bill Clinton called for a "new covenant" between American citizens and their government. But few complained after Bush spoke from the National Cathedral pulpit to comfort the American people and rouse them "to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil." Have Christians allowed partisanship to creep into their public theology?

Addressing the question of a "Christian" politics, C. S. Lewis wrote, "Most of us are not really approaching the subject in order to find out what Christianity says: We are approaching it in the hope of finding support from Christianity for the views of our own party. We are looking for an ally where we are offered either a Master or—a Judge." Should Christians invoke God's favor for political ends? That depends on the role that religion should play in a self-governing regime. Three principles should inform this discussion.

First, government may appeal to the religious sentiment of the citizenry for support of the regime because one of the principal duties of government is to protect religious freedom. George Washington wrote to the United Baptist

Churches in Virginia that "every man, conducting himself as a good citizen, and being accountable to God alone for his religious opinions, ought to be protected in worshipping the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience." He was even more direct in his letter to the General Assembly of Presbyterian Churches: "While all men within our territories are protected in worshipping the Deity according to the dictates of their consciences, it is rationally to be expected from them in return, that they will be emulous of evincing the sanctity of their professions by the innocence of their lives and the beneficence of their actions."

Free Exercise and Political Prudence

In his Farewell Address, Washington called religion and morality the "firmest props of the duties of men and citizens" and cautioned against those who would undermine the connection between "religious principle," "national morality," and "political prosperity." The father of our country saw no problem with using the bully pulpit to encourage public piety for the sake of governmental stability. But what does the Bible say?

According to Romans 13:1, "Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established." Paul writes that beyond the threat of punishment one's conscience obliges Christians to submit to the authorities. In his First Letter to Timothy, Paul adds that Christians should pray for their rulers, "that we may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness." The hope is that God, "who wants all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth," will add to his church through the testimony of an obedient and praying church (1 Tim. 2:1–3). A political appeal to the religious sentiments of the citizenry, therefore, finds support in the Scriptures.

***The phrase "One Nation Under God" creates a responsibility in us to act as a people, both nation and church, under God's* judgment *as well as his* blessing.**

— Lucas E. Morel

Discussion of the tension between religion and politics usually centers on the threat religion poses to the state. But religion's support of the limited purposes of government leads to a second principle: The state should respect religion enough not to tread on its turf. Calvinists call this principle *sphere sovereignty*; Roman Catholics call it *subsidiarity*. And one way this political respect for, and accommodation of, religion can work is to allow religious expression in civic affairs.

While not inconsistent with the promotion of a civil religion that bolsters law-abidingness, this principle's chief aim is to allow citizens to exercise their faith as citizens without hindrance from the government. Moreover, this principle allows the state to facilitate the religious sentiments of the people. Examples include presidential proclamations of a national day of thanksgiving or prayer, congressional chaplains, and printing currency with the inscription, "In God We Trust."

A third principle offers a more a cautionary note: Religious expression in the public square, whether as part of a civil religion or political accommodation of the faith of the citizenry, is not a risk-free proposition. Simply put, religious fanaticism can lead to political fanaticism, whereby the counsels of moderation and compromise by prudent officeholders are sacrificed to the demands of utopian moralists.

Richard John Neuhaus once defined democracy as "the necessary expression of humility in which all persons and institutions are held accountable to transcendent purpose imperfectly discerned." And as the *Federalist* argued from the outset, political debates find "wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society." Because no citizen speaks with infallible logic on any public matter, moderation in public debate as well as compromise guided by principle become the operative guideposts for political decision making.

But *the* American proof text for applying religion to political affairs is Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address. Ironically, Lincoln used religion to demonstrate religion's failure to resolve a political crisis. We hasten to add, though, that religion as a political tool was not alone in its inability to avert the Civil War. Lincoln devoted most of his First Inaugural Address—a far more lengthy speech than his Second Inaugural Address—to a strictly rational argument in an effort to dissuade Southern dissenters from leaving the Union. Needless to say, Lincoln's presidential logic failed to prevent the firing upon Fort Sumter and the commencement of the war.

In his Second Inaugural Address, Lincoln pointed out that although the American people read the same Bible and prayed

to the same God, they still drew opposite conclusions about God's opinion of secession and slavery. This did not keep Lincoln from expressing his incredulity about those who would "dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces." But, quoting Matthew 7:1, he hastened to counsel the nation to "judge not that we be not judged."

Trying to discern the meaning of a civil war that neither side wanted at first—a war more costly than predicted and producing an emancipation no one expected—Lincoln concluded, "The Almighty has His own purposes." At the National Cathedral, Bush also noted that "God's signs are not always the ones we look for. We learn in tragedy that his purposes are not always our own." God's judgments remain inscrutable this side of the veil. Nevertheless, his general will and intentions for his creation—especially for those who believe in him—remain fairly clear. Accordingly, Lincoln exhorted a pious but divided nation to act "with malice toward none, with charity for all."

Lincoln exhorted a pious but divided nation to act "with malice toward none, with charity for all."

Lincoln once called Americans the "almost chosen people" and their form of government "the last best hope of earth." This echoed the sentiments of Washington, who spoke at length in his First Inaugural Address about "providential aid" in establishing the American republic and the "pious gratitude" owed by Americans: "No people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand which conducts the affairs of men, more than the people of the United States. Every step by which they have advanced to the character of an independent nation seems to have been distinguished by some token of providential agency." At the very least, the idea of American exceptionalism has a long and distinguished pedigree.

A Divine Mandate for Justice and Right

Psalm 33:12 reads: "Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord, the people he chose for his inheritance." This is no boast, for the rest of the psalm declares the simple but all-important truth that God offers his presence and supply to any and all who put their trust in him. Historically, the people of Israel were chosen by God to be a blessing unto the nations. Since the coming of Christ, and his rule over the church, the nations have witnessed a new and growing people of God, drawn from all tongues and tribes, and called to be a blessing to all people by teaching them about the present and future rule of the Lord Jesus Christ.

With *e pluribus unum* ("out of many, one") as its motto and the equal rights of human beings as its operative principle, America looks like a political analog to this revelatory picture of God's relationship to his church. G. K. Chesterton even called America "a nation with the soul of a church." Needless to say, the United States is not a church. Thus, any special attention received from the Almighty follows because a predominantly Christian populace exercises its civic responsibility, as with the other nations of the world, "to punish those who do wrong and to commend those who do right" (1 Pet. 2:14).

Earlier this year, the National Day of Prayer adopted the theme "One Nation Under God." Added in 1954 to the Pledge of Allegiance, this phrase reminds us that our politics are just as much a part of our spiritual life as any other earthly activity or institution. It speaks of God's providence over our nation, which creates a responsibility in us to act as a people, both nation and church, under God's *judgment* as well as his *blessing*. In short, we must govern ourselves according to principles of justice and right and not merely majority rule or numerical might.

From his inauguration address to his statements following the tragedy of September 11, President Bush has beckoned the nation to "a power larger than ourselves." And the song "God Bless America" has become a second national anthem as Americans seek comfort, strength, guidance, and resolve in their efforts to rebuild their lives in a terrorist-shaken world. This is quite a turn of events for a country long known for its veneration of the self-made man.

The United States became a nation, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, "appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions" and "with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence." And while July 4 is justly celebrated as the nation's Independence Day, Americans will do well to acknowledge their national *dependence* each Thanksgiving Day.

God be praised.

***Lucas E. Morel, Ph.D.**, is assistant professor of politics at Washington and Lee University, author of* Lincoln's Sacred Effort: Defining Religion's Role in American Self-Government *(Lexington Books), and a contributing editor to* Religion & Liberty.

A Different Kind of Enlightenment

Ingrid A. Merikoski

It is now common to argue that the roots of many of the features of modern culture—secularism, utilitarianism, and materialism, to name a few—are found in the ideas of the Enlightenment, a European-wide, eighteenth-century movement described by Immanuel Kant as "man's release from his self-incurred tutelage."

Kant suggested that the Enlightenment freed man from his inability to use innate understanding without guidance from another person. More broadly, the Enlightenment as it unfolded in certain parts of Europe stressed above all the autonomy of reason as the key tool through which human thought and action might be explored. The term *Enlightenment* has become most closely associated with France, where thinkers such as Voltaire argued for the primacy of reason with no less a purpose in mind than to "regenerate" humankind, to elevate mankind over the individual, to emphasize the superiority of what Jean-Jacques Rousseau called "the greatest happiness of all" over individual concerns.

The individual who generated ideas thought in an enlightened way. The enlightened person accepted an idea based on personal reflection rather than on the authority of another. The enlightened person had freedom of will and the freedom to debate ideas in the public square. Theoretically, there was ample room in enlightened France for philosophical disagreement, although toleration—particularly for a positive role for religion in society—was sometimes elusive. The perceived lofty and admirable nature of these freedoms carried an implicit challenge to received understanding about the importance of faith and religious truth in culture. We know that the rational scrutiny of religion—Christianity in particular—is a hallmark of the French Enlightenment's legacy.

The purpose of this essay is not to enter into debate about the French Enlightenment but to introduce readers to the increasingly prevalent notion in contemporary historical circles that the Enlightenment, best understood, encompassed a variety of intellectual movements, the focus of which was not necessarily the apotheosis of reason. To reply today to the deceptively simple question, What was the Enlightenment?, one must look at intellectual developments in Germany, America, England, Scotland, Scandinavia, and Russia.

Specifically, American readers might focus on the Scottish Enlightenment, the leading thinkers of which include well-known figures such as Adam Smith and David Hume. Their books, along with those of lesser-known but equally important thinkers such as Francis Hutcheson, Adam Ferguson, William Robertson, Hugh Blair, John Witherspoon, and Thomas Reid, were found in the libraries of the Founding Fathers and in the drawing rooms of the merchants and professionals of Philadelphia, Charleston, and New York. Above all, the Scots concerned themselves with exploring human nature in the fullest sense. Readers will be familiar with the contributions of Adam Smith to political economy and David Hume to philosophy. What may be less familiar is the fact that Smith, Hume, and their colleagues among the Scottish literati rooted their investigations into human nature in a profound appreciation of the roles of morality and ethics, aesthetics, social theory, law, historiography, religion, and language in human thought and action. To highlight some of the unique features of Scottish Enlightenment thought, we will look at the Scots' treatment of morality and ethics, first; then, law and jurisprudence; and, finally, religion.

The Moral Sense and Ethics

In their search for what Hume called the "ultimate original qualities" of human nature, the Scots relied first on moral philosophy. If the rational philosopher, the *philosophe,* was the standard bearer of the French Enlightenment, the moral philosopher filled the same role for the Scots. Their discussions about the nature of morality and moral knowledge fell between two extremes: The first suggested that moral laws could be identified only through revelation from God; the second suggested that morality was the product of the innermost workings of human nature. While Enlightenment literati addressed the nature of morality differently, particularly regarding the religious dimensions of moral decision making, they shared a common purpose: to identify a moral order in behavior and human identity and to ask if this order sprang from external influences or from a natural sense within the human mind and heart. In the Scots' view, adherence to this moral order was required of all members of society and

underscored the fundamental structure of civilized Enlightenment society.

The Scots placed their discussions about moral philosophy within the framework of an intellectual legacy inherited from seventeenth-century European discussions about morality and natural law. This discussion was transported into Scottish intellectual life during the early decades of the eighteenth century by academics trained at European universities; the most notable among them was Gerschom Carmichael, instructor in philosophy at the University of Glasgow from 1694, and, from 1727, its first Professor of Moral Philosophy. Carmichael was deeply influenced by Dutch philosophers Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, who addressed matters of ethics as part of a wider effort to define moral standards affecting all manner of social interaction. Essentially, Grotius and Pufendorf argued that man was, by nature, a social animal and that the social world was defined by a complex network of authority and mutual obligation to one's fellow citizens. Ethics and morality were the arbiters and mainstays of good and responsible citizenship.

Francis Hutcheson, an Irish-born clergyman who became the preeminent moral theorist of his generation and the philosophical forefather of Hume and Smith, succeeded Carmichael as Professor of Moral Philosophy. Hume sought Hutcheson's advice while drafting his *Treatise on Human Nature*. For Smith, Hutcheson was a "never to be forgotten" professor from his undergraduate days. Hutcheson's preeminent contribution was to shift the direction in which Scottish moral philosophy evolved by developing a theory of the moral sense, a God-given faculty that permitted human beings to distinguish between good and evil, or between morally correct or incorrect behavior. Hutcheson believed that humans have a distinct "perception of moral excellence" that cannot be clouded or influenced by human will.

The Scots placed their discussions about moral philosophy within the framework of morality and natural law.

— Ingrid A. Merikoski



This absence of the will was a crucial feature of Hutcheson's understanding of the moral sense, which permitted him to reply to philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes or Bernard Mandeville, who argued that, ultimately, all human action is driven by self-interest or selfishness. If it was impossible to switch off the moral sense in daily life, and if the moral sense informed human action and underscored steady behavior, the likelihood of acting from selfish motivations was diminished.

As concerned as he was to present his arguments about the moral sense in a philosophically coherent manner, Hutcheson also concentrated on the practical application of moral philosophy to daily life. Hutcheson was a practical moralist, who followed in the tradition of the Roman philosopher, Cicero, to encourage his students and readers to exercise their moral abilities through the pursuit of an active life. In so doing, Hutcheson believed, they contributed to the promotion of virtue in society. This, in turn, underscored the moral and social order. Here, too, Hutcheson's perspective was widely adopted by the Enlightenment literati.

As a Presbyterian minister, Hutcheson eagerly combined his advocacy of virtue with a firm belief in Christian principles. He believed that divine grace and fostering the happiness of others laid at the heart of moral goodness. He also accepted the notion that life should be seen as a progress toward virtue and that individuals are capable of self-improvement. The best means for achieving progress consisted in following the disciplines of duty, faith, and virtue, incorporated with the lessons of human experience. For Hutcheson, moral philosophy was ultimately useful because it served to better not only the individual but also the quality of public life.

As Gertrude Himmelfarb recently noted, neither Hutcheson nor his followers denied the powers of reason; the Scots were not "irrationalists." In varying degrees, they assigned reason a secondary role in contributing toward the cultivation of virtue and moral knowledge. This was true even for Hume, noted for his unsentimental views on human nature, who, following Hutcheson, wrote that human beings had "an instinct" stemming from a "moral taste" or "benevolence" that guided the course of virtuous action. Hume wrote, "There is some benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and serpent." Smith built on Hutcheson's legacy by developing as part of his moral theory a theory of sympathy, through which people appreciate the nature and consequences of their actions and moderate or regulate their behavior accordingly. By exercising all of one's moral fac-

ulties, the Scots concluded, the ideal character of an enlightened person might be found. Smith describes such a person in his *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*: "The perfectly virtuous man desires not only to be loved, but to be lovely…, not only praise, but praiseworthiness.… To feel much for others and little for ourselves,… to retrain our selfish and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature."

Law and Jurisprudence

Before the eighteenth century, Scotland had in place a long-established legal system built on the code of civil law that was, and remains, autonomous and distinct from the English legal system. Members of the legal community, with their colleagues in the universities and in the Church of Scotland, played a crucial role in fostering intellectual exchange during the Enlightenment. Jurists such as Henry Home, Lord Kames earned great distinction as a patron of a number of the Enlightenment literati while making his own contribution to legal scholarship by publishing his *Historical Law Tracts*. These tracts advanced understanding about the legal needs of an enlightened commercial society in a style accessible to "every person who has an appetite for knowledge." Kames argued that legal principles had to "connect with manners and politics" in society to show how legal institutions affected all citizens, safeguarded property rights, and reflected the moral priorities of the community.

For the Enlightenment literati, generally, treatment of legal theory rested primarily in studying jurisprudence, which they defined as the theory of rules through which civil governments were directed. The first duty of any government was to "maintain justice; to prevent the members of society from encroaching on one another's property, or seizing what is not their own," Smith notes. "The design here is to give each one the secure and peaceable possession of his own property," he continues. "When this end, which we may call the *internal peace*, is secured, the government will next be desirous of promoting the opulence of the state," to include trade, commerce, manufactures and agriculture. Smith developed his explanation of the relationships between justice, property, and civil authority in his *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, which laid partial foundations for further discussion of property and political economy in *The Wealth of Nations*.

The lesser-known member of the literati, John Erskine of Carnock, provided another avenue for debate about the role of law in society. Erskine devised a framework for a type of Scottish natural law, which focused on orderliness in the world (with *orderliness* meaning, essentially, lawful behavior), that helped human beings deal with changing fortunes. Erskine suggested that all action in the world occurs under the law of nature promulgated by God. Within the law of nature, distinctions are made between intelligent beings and all other creatures. Intelligent beings may exercise free will to reject the laws of nature; other creatures obey because they have no other option. Erskine placed God at the center of his writings, stressing the need for people to learn God's law either by reading Scriptures or by adhering to the "law written in our hearts," conscience, the moral sense, or the impulse that tells one if behavior is just.

By contrast, Hume believed that justice was essentially a human invention designed to impose restrains, when needed, to achieve order and harmony in society. Justice was to be contrasted with sentiments or moral impulses because Hume did not believe that humans have a *natural feeling* of justice. For example, there is no law of human nature, in Hume's view, that makes one respect another person's property. A system of justice is required for the sake of public utility; indeed, Hume wrote, "public utility is the *sole* origin of justice." The connections that Hume and his colleagues made between law, justice, property, and government were precise and deliberate, and it is noteworthy that in many of his writings, Hume discusses justice exclusively as it relates to property. Unlike many of his counterparts in the French Enlightenment, Hume did not extend the role of justice to include questions of equality or human rights.

The Enlightenment, best understood, encompassed a variety of intellectual movements the focus of which was not necessarily the apotheosis of reason.

Religion

Erskine's reliance on divine authority to underpin his concept of the law reflected a strong tendency among many of the Scottish literati to keep a central place for the Divine in their social and philosophical works. No disparity between the Scots and the French could have been greater than that over religion. Not only were there differences in the relationship of church to state in each country, but there were also distinctly different cultural legacies inherited by Enlightenment thinkers from Roman Catholicism in France and Calvinism or Presbyterianism in Scotland.

Among the Scots, a broad range of positions on religion existed. William Robertson, Hugh Blair, Thomas Reid, and

Adam Ferguson were active ministers of the Church of Scotland. If not an outright atheist, Hume was deeply skeptical about religion. Smith was raised in the Calvinist tradition but may have ended his life as a deist. Aside from personal professions of faith or formal ecclesiastical training, the Scottish literati's interest in anthropology and culture fostered study of Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and religions of the Far East.

Robertson and Blair were members of a group of ministers, the Moderate Clergy of the Church of Scotland, who were particularly friendly to the moral theories of Hutcheson, Smith, and, to a large extent, Hume. The Moderates emphasized the benefits of Enlightenment commercial society, yet it fell to senior ministers such as Robertson and Blair to emphasize Christianity's role in the eighteenth-century commercial world order. In so doing, they safeguarded the church's position as a moral bulwark against self-interest or avarice. To accomplish this, the Moderates developed a kind of Christian Stoicism—drawing on many of the writings of Greek and Roman Stoic philosophers whom they admired—to reconcile matters of faith and secular ethics. Christian Stoicism was a sometimes complex construct that blended virtue in private and public life with Christian morality. This, in turn, permitted them to argue for a necessary connection between faith and social ethics in Enlightenment society. There were philosophical imperfections within Christian Stoicism, yet these imperfections did not diminish the success of Christian Stoicism in conveying moral messages. Rather, they reflected the traditionally problematic relationship between faith and reason in history. To the criticism of some of their contemporaries, the Moderates did not focus on areas of philosophical incompatibility; rather, they stressed areas of compatibility between faith and ethics to promote what they believed to be the public good. In a sense, the Moderates undertook a process of what Himmelfarb has called a "socializing of religion" rather than a rationalizing of it.

Although several among the Scottish literati were friendly with leading luminaries of the French Enlightenment, the Enlightenment movement took different forms across Europe in substance, emphasis, and social temper. Disagreements among French, Scottish, and English counterparts did not prevent a great degree of intellectual exchange among the key thinkers. Unlike the French, the Scots' Enlightenment messages were characterized by an egalitarian flavor. In theory, moral improvement, the possibility of achieving virtue, and the enjoyment of material progress were accessible to all members of society, albeit in varying degrees. Furthermore, in maintaining a place for matters of faith in society, the Scots left a space in their philosophical theories for the enlightened person who is "truly human simply by virtue of being born in the image of God."

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Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in the Fallen World

by Robert P. Kraynak

University of Notre Dame Press, 320 pp. Paperback: $24.95

Review by Ken Masugi

A committed Roman Catholic, Robert Kraynak has produced one of the most significant political books for American Catholics since John Courtney Murray's *We Hold These Truths*. A professor of political theory at Colgate University, Kraynak deserves mention along with Murray, Jacques Maritain, and Reinhold Niebuhr as a thoughtful commentator on the most profound of issues. His work will shake any reader, secular or faithful, to rethink the relationship between one's citizenship and one's faith.

"We must face the disturbing dilemma that modern liberal democracy needs God, but God is not as liberal or as democratic as we would like Him to be" (italics in original). Kraynak's argument, presented initially as the Frank M. Covey Lectures at Loyola University, carefully combines sober analysis of church history and biblical scholarship with scathing assessments of the politicization of contemporary theology. "Christianity is the fullness of truth," he writes. "The loss of this grand and exhilarating perspective is another casuality of modern Christianity and its principled embrace of human rights." Democracy requires a strong, not enervated, Christianity, "because its moral claims cannot be vindicated by secular and rational means alone." In making this dual argument, Kraynak brilliantly exposes the theological and political problems caused by the close relationship between what he variously labels as democracy, liberalism, lib-

erty, and Kantianism, on the one hand, and Christianity, on the other. The modern world is in the grips of deteriorated family life, materialism, and a willfulness dominating all aspects of life. In place of this contemporary muddle of moral anarchy, Kraynak reminds Christians of Saint Augustine's teaching of the two cities—the City of Man and the City of God, whose "conception of human dignity [is] based on the *Imago Dei*." Christians should enter into a prudential relationship between their primary citizenship in the City of God and a political order that would not necessarily possess the attributes of modern liberal regimes. Christianity must exhibit a hierarchy and transcendence that egalitarian political orders must disdain. For the good of both realms, they must remain separate, until we enter "a new historical stage."

But Kraynak misunderstands modernity and America and how Christianity relates to them. The contemporary "liberal democratic conception of human dignity based on autonomous self-determination" is not the heart of liberal democracy, at least as understood by the American Founders. But for Kraynak, "Together, the subversive thrust of rights and the leveling effects of democracy undermine the hierarchical doctrine of the Two Cities." In fact, America, in its soul, is far more friendly to Christianity than he thinks, for its soul is not liberal and Kantian in the sense that he criticizes.

Kraynak seeks instead a "stable constitutional order, rather than democracy or human rights per se, the litmus test of legitimate government for Christians." This "constitutionalism without liberalism" permits a practical accommodation with the modern world without turning the Christian faith into a mirror image of political liberalism. Kraynak does not provide practical examples of what such a tranquillity of order would look like and how it would function. In this connection, he brings forth the redoubtable Alexander Solzhenitsyn as a model, who presents a sober argument for democracy that does not depend on a notion of rights. Indeed, in his hunt to find unsavory liberal elements in contemporary theology, Kraynak finds Kantianism in the "personalism" of Maritain, Murray, Michael Novak, and Pope John Paul II, though, in his Holiness's case, the "arguments in favor of freedom and democracy are always qualified" by Thomism. But arguments for freedom are always qualified, just as Kraynak qualifies his arguments for hierarchy. To quote elsewhere from the pope's message welcoming Ambassador Lindy Boggs, which Kraynak cites, "It would truly be a sad thing if the religious and moral convictions upon which the American experiment was founded could now somehow be considered a danger to free society." Kraynak appears to make the equally sad error that even the most refined conception of freedom might endanger the City of God by allowing the modern degeneration he rightly fears.

The modern world's fixation on rights prevents it from being friendly to Christianity, Kraynak argues. "Rights themselves become tyrannical" because they can be used in bad ways. This proves that "rights themselves" are not the problem. "The notion that God created man to enjoy natural rights and establish government by consent—the founding principle of liberal democracy or republican self-government—is not in the Bible." (As are many things, we would add.)

In fact, America, in its soul, is far more friendly to Christianity than Kraynak thinks, for its soul is not liberal and Kantian in the sense that he criticizes.

— Ken Masugi

Indeed, we need to "sever the Christian-democratic connection and start all over again." Yet Kraynak rejects the rule of priests and the corrupting pride that he knows can arise in theocracies.

Thus, Kraynak's critique of American liberalism itself displays a concession to the liberalism he battles. Among other difficulties, he conflates contemporary liberalism with the liberalism of the American Founding. Deconstructionist and multiculturalist Richard Rorty somehow becomes the logical successor of James Madison. Kant's liberalism, with its emphasis on a willed equality of the kingdom of ends as the measure of morality, can thus be blithely exchanged with the liberalism founded by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. (I had thought that Baron von Steuben was the only prominent Prussian in the American Founding.) For Kraynak, "Rights cannot be stopped from endorsing the infinity of desire and the pride in human autonomy which leads modern people to deny their dependence on God's providence and God's grace as well as to deny their duties to neighbors and society. In this way, rights themselves become tyrannical." Kraynak does not appreciate the overthrow of the Founding's liberal, limited government by Progressivism, the New Deal, and the Great Society. It is odd that

Kraynak could think that we have more freedom now than at the time of the Founding. For him, it is a seamless web of liberalism. Evidently it would not have made any significant difference who won the Civil War.

Kraynak acknowledges there are American resources friendly to Christians, but he derides them as mere "civil religion": Washington's declarations of religious liberty, Thanksgiving (unappreciated as a religious holiday), and Lincoln's speeches. But after September 11, it is clearer than ever that the "Battle Hymn of the Republic" is more reflective of the American soul than John Rawls's latest tome. America is a blend of ancient, modern, and Christian principles. Representation, for example, is, in fact, a more aristocratic (in Aristotle's sense) than he allows, for it is a means of promoting excellence. Rights are not properly understood as mere Hobbesian grasping for power; recall Lincoln's oft-stated view that there is no right to do wrong, and that right makes might.



Finally, Kraynak underestimates the power and purpose of civil religion. The liberal American regime is the best regime for Christians. They should use this uniquely suited civil religion to win souls for their faith. Civil religion is a potential for transcendent aims, as well as a good in itself. (Consider how the friendship of virtue refines and elevates the friendship of utility in Aristotle's *Ethics.*) In this way, civil religion is a source for the virtue that republican government requires most of any form. The City of God is a lot closer to the American regime than Kraynak allows. I would add that the American civil religion was one element (along with, among others, reading Saint Thomas and the prayers of friends) that was responsible for my own conversion to Catholicism almost seven years ago.

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Globalization and the Kingdom of God

by Bob Goudzwaard

Baker Books, 128 pp. Paperback: $11.95

Review by Peter J. Hill

Globalization and the Kingdom of God contains the annual Kuyper Lecture, presented at the Center for Public Justice in 1999, along with responses by three commentators. The lecture was delivered by Bob Goudzwaard, Professor Emeritus, Free University of Amsterdam. Goudzwaard also served in the Dutch Parliament in the 1970s and is a well-respected authority on issues of Christian faith, economics, and public policy. The responses were given by Brian Fikkert, Covenant College; Larry Reed, Opportunity International; and Adolfo Garcia de la Sienra, a Mexican economist and philosopher.

Goudzwaard offers a partial defense of globalization but also criticizes several aspects of it. His argument for globalization consists of three parts. First, God clearly wants to create a global community through the Gospel message and to include all of humanity in that community. Therefore, according to Goudzwaard, "The question, then, is not whether Christians should be for or against globalization. Instead, the question is, 'What kind of globalization should we be supporting?'"

Second, he argues that the intrinsic worth of creation means that we cannot demonize what God has given us, and globalization can be an appropriate use of God's good gifts.

Third, Goudzwaard believes that economic life under the control of God can be redemptive in that it can "honor the worldwide diversity of God's good creation and prefigure the reign of the coming Lord."

However, Goudzwaard is also critical of how globalization can feed the desire for personal autonomy and self-aggrandizement. In other words, the extension of markets and market relations to more and more of the world can encourage the replacement of a God-centered perspective on our humanity with a very different virtual reality, one in which satisfying the self becomes the ruling dogma.

Goudzwaard's criticism of modern secular thinking and its extension through global markets highlights an important issue. In many societies, people are moving from a God-centered understanding of who they are to a human-centered worldview. Goudzwaard also expresses an appropriate concern for whether the benefits of globalization will reach the poor of the world and, in particular, whether the world of international finance will move capital to developing economies.

However, the lecture suffers from both sins of omission and sins of commission. The greatest omission is any significant discussion of the gains from trade and the benefits to poor people from extending opportunities for exchange

and production into their lives. Goudzwaard never answers the important question, Is there something inherent in uncoerced, voluntary trades that should cause Christians to oppose such exchanges? Increased opportunities for voluntary trades are fundamentally what globalization is all about. It is driven by the lowering of transaction costs so that there is more specialization in production and more exchange between people and across boundaries. And there is considerable evidence that the extension of opportunities for producing and trading is an important contributor to the alleviation of poverty around the world.

Therefore, it would have been helpful if Goudzwaard had dealt more directly with certain basic issues. For instance, if it makes sense for people in Wisconsin to trade with people in Arkansas, why does it not make sense for people in West Virginia to trade with people in India? Although he recognizes that economic activity can represent part of the goodness of creation, he spends little time discussing how voluntary trades create wealth and can be a part of that goodness. It is true that using markets and prices as mechanisms for economic coordination can lead to greater materialism and personal autonomy. But every institutional order has its temptations and Goudzwaard does not deal completely enough with the issue of alternative institutional orders and their temptations. The crucial question is whether globalization is a better or worse institutional order than the alternatives. Of course, one can argue that, in order to be effective in reducing poverty, globalization must occur under a regime of well-defined rights and the rule of law. But Goudzwaard never tells us whether the lack of those institutions is at the root of his distrust of globalization.

Goudzwaard also seems to have a misunderstanding of how world financial markets operate. He argues that international capital liquidity means that developing economies face severe constraints on their economic activity because of the problem of capital flight. He also decries the fact that 95 percent of international money transfers are pure financial transactions. He calls this an unequal balance between the "real sphere" and the "financial sphere" in the international economy. However, it is not the case that capital is simply moving around the world in cyberspace with no connection to real economic variables. Capital movements facilitate production and exchange, and they are ultimately rooted in economic reality. Also, the fact that capital can flee a country reflects on the extent to which governments are performing their functions. This serves to make nation states more accountable for their actions and should be viewed as a benefit rather than a perversion of the financial system.

The commentators all provide useful suggestions for how Christians should live in a world where wealth is readily available for some but a distant reality for others. However, only Fikkert deals in any depth with how we should construct our institutions in the face of human sinfulness. De la Sienra criticizes markets for not reflecting "true" human needs. Instead, he argues that societies ought to use more democratic governance in determining what values are met. The assumption that the political order is much superior to the market as a reflector of true needs is a critical one, and evidence from around the world casts grave doubts on the validity of such an assumption.

Goudzwaard never answers the question, Is there something inherent in voluntary trades that should cause Christians to oppose such exchanges?

— Peter J. Hill



Goudzwaard makes similar assumptions about the ability of world governments to come together to "chain or tame the wild animal of global finance before it breaks out of its cage entirely." Regulation that reduces fraud and enhances contract enforcement can be a useful complement to effective global finance. But Goudzwaard wants to move considerably beyond that, to limit financial movements in order to enhance public well-being. Again, that is a terribly optimistic reading of the workings of national governments and international politics.

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“Some regard private enterprise as if it were a predatory tiger to be shot. Others look upon it as a cow that they can milk. Only a handful see it for what it really is—the strong horse that pulls the whole cart.”

— Winston Churchill —