Rediscovering “Calling” Will Revitalize Church and Society

Interview: Os Guinness
Dr. Os Guinness is the senior fellow of the Trinity Forum and the author of many books, including *The American Hour: A Time of Reckoning and the Once and Future Role of Faith* (The Free Press), *God in the Dark: The Assurance of Faith Beyond a Shadow of Doubt* (Crossway), and, his most recent, *The Call: Finding and Fulfilling the Central Purpose of Your Life* (Word).

*R&L: In your book, The American Hour, you say that America, at her best, is a liberal experiment. In this context, what do you mean by “liberal”?*

Guinness: I mean it, not it its modern sense, but in its nineteenth-century sense of liberalism in the relation of faith and freedom. I think the framers were clear that faith and freedom were integral.

Faith was foundational to the United States at three points. The first was winning freedom; just take the enormous influence of the “black regiment,” the preachers and thinkers behind the American Revolution. The second was the ordering of freedom; nothing is closer to the genius of the United States than the First Amendment and its establishing the separation of church and state in such a constructive way. And the third—which is less stressed today—was the sustaining of freedom; refer to James Madison’s argument that faith is vital to virtue, and that virtue is vital to freedom. So, those who think you can have an empty or ungrounded freedom misunderstand the framers.

*R&L: Would you say, then, that freedom is not freedom from, but freedom for?*

Guinness: Paraphrasing Lord Acton, “Freedom is not the permission to do what we like, it is the power to do what we ought.” The trouble is that, today, freedom is purely negative: freedom from parents, from teachers, from the police, and so on. We have lost sight of it as freedom to be that which we can be or ought to be. We need to recover the idea that, as Lord Acton stressed wisely and as the present pope has written of so well, freedom is the power to do what we ought. That assumes, however, we know the truth of who we are and what we ought to do. That is the freedom the modern secular liberal tends to forget.

*R&L: And does being a follower of Christ tutor us in how to exercise our freedom in relation to the truth?*

Guinness: Absolutely. To me, one of the most appalling things in this country at the moment is the capitulation to the postmodern view of truth—the view that truth is relative, socially determined, and all a manner of human construction, and that any truth claim is really a disguised bid for power.

What proponents of this view do not realize is that when all claims to truth are reduced to forms of bids for power, you just open yourself up to power games. That is an incredibly dangerous,
Nietzschean moment.

When Vaclav Havel and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn resisted the Soviet regime, they did so on the basis of truth. “One word of truth,” Solzhenitsyn wrote, “outweighs the entire world.” Or in the words of Havel, “Truth prevails for those who live in truth.” Many Western liberals applauded them at the time, but they do not have the same, strong concept of truth to do the job today.

People thought that postmodernism promised a brave new world of knowledge, but they are suddenly beginning to realize it is a highly manipulative and very dangerous world. And when you see the dangers, suddenly you see the enormous significance of the words of Jesus: “You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” There is no freedom without truth.

_R&L: In the first chapter of your new book, The Call, you mention that you have been reflecting on the concept of calling for nearly twenty-five years. Why does this concept so appeal to you, and why did you write this book now?_

Guinness: On a personal level, it was the concept of calling that helped me discover my own purpose in life. Furthermore, in my travels through the English-speaking world, the questions I have been asked most frequently have to do with calling. All across the West today, people are seeking a deeper sense of individual purpose.

As Fyodor Dostoyevski put it, “The secret of man’s being is not only to live, but to live for something definite.” Or as Søren Kierkegaard put it, “The goal is to find the idea for which I can live and die.” I come across such longing in people again and again, and there is no question that the Call is this longing’s deepest answer.

_R&L: How do you define “the Call”?_

Guinness: Simply put, the Call is the idea that God calls us to Himself so decisively that everything we are, everything we have, and everything we do is invested with a dynamism and a devotion because it is done as a response to His summons.

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R&L: But these distinctions are not hard and fast, are they? Especially in recent years, there has been a great deal of cross-over between Protestants and Roman Catholics on this issue.

Guinness: That is exactly right. For example, many Protestants today more deeply manifest the Catholic distortion than many Catholics. You see it enshrined in the notion, “full-time Christian service,” as if ministers and missionaries are full-time and everyone else is part-time. That view is anathema to the New Testament’s understanding of discipleship.

R&L: And in many ways the present pope seems to have a very “Protestant” view of work and calling.

Guinness: Pope John Paul II is, in many ways, closer to Luther and Calvin than many of Luther and Calvin’s followers today. You also have the distinguished

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Saint Thomas Aquinas (c.1225–1274)

“It is lawful for man to possess property…. Human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately.”

Thomas Aquinas displayed remarkable acumen in his early education and, to the dismay of his parents, resolved to embrace the religious life. He received the Order of Saint Dominic sometime between 1240 and 1243, and continued studying under Europe’s greatest scholars, including Albertus Magnus. Aquinas spent his life teaching, traveling, preaching, and writing, until a powerful religious experience at Naples in 1273 caused him to put down his pen forever. His masterpiece, the *Summa Theologica*, a culmination of his attempt to synthesize Aristotelian philosophy with Christian theology, was left unfinished. He died on March 7, 1274.

Aquinas’s economic thought is inseparable from his understanding of natural law. In his view, natural law is an ethic derived from observing the fundamental norms of human nature. These norms can be understood as the will of God for creation. An unlawful act is that which perverts God’s design for a particular part of His creation.

Economic transactions, according to Aquinas, should be considered within this framework, since they occur as human attempts to obtain materials provided by nature to achieve certain ends.

Private property is a desirable economic institution because it complements man’s internal desire for order. “Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law,” Aquinas writes in the *Summa Theologica*, “but an addition thereto devised by human reason.” The state, however, has the authority to maintain a legal framework for commercial life, such as enforcing rules prohibiting theft, force, and fraud. In this way, civil law is a reflection of the natural law. Further, Aquinas believed that private ownership of property is the best guarantee of a peaceful and orderly society, for it provides maximum incentive for the responsible stewardship of property.

Aquinas helped relax the traditionally negative view of mercantile trade that figured prominently in, for example, Patristic thought. For Aquinas, trade itself is not evil; rather, its moral worth depends on the motive and conduct of the trader. In addition, the risk associated with bringing goods from where they are abundant to where they are scarce justifies mercantile profit. The merchant, however, must direct his profits toward virtuous ends.

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Sources: *Summa Theologica* by Thomas Aquinas (Benziger Bros, 1947), and “Thomas Aquinas” by D. J. Kennedy in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (Robert Appleton Company, 1912).
Catholic writer and speaker Michael Novak, who in his book Business As a Calling comes very close to an idea with which the Puritans would have felt thoroughly at home.

**R&L: Do you envision an important conversation between Roman Catholics and evangelical Protestants on the issue of calling?**

**Guinness:** I think it is another area where there can be very fruitful interchange. Calling gives a tremendous dignity to the whole of life. This is enormously significant as a way to combat secularization and the modern world’s tendency to sequester religion to private life, where it is free to flourish, and banish it from public life, where it is irrelevant. Both Catholic and evangelical followers of Christ have an interest in seeing the Lordship of Christ and the integration of faith with every part of life lived out in practice. This is one of those truths that can do it.

In the United States, some Christians tend to talk as if the problem is that Christians are absent from certain spheres, say, the university or the media. In most cases, however, that is not the problem. It is not that the Christians are not where they should be, the problem is that they are not what they should be right where they are. It is a tragedy that so many Christians at such an hour, facing such challenges, should be so ineffective, but a renewal of the notion of calling—everyone, everywhere, everything—can make an incredible, dynamic difference. Of the small handfuls of truths that have a historically proven track record for being able to stir people, calling, along with the cross of Christ, is at the very top of the list.

**R&L: Throughout your discussion of calling, you cite many who, out of their own sense of calling, opposed barbaric and tyrannous regimes—people like Dietrich Bonhoffer, Vaclav Havel, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. What is it about calling that enables men and women to stand against the tides of the times?**

**Guinness:** One of the themes introduced by the Puritans is the notion that people live by calling, in other words, living by faith to the glory of God and having one audience—the audience of one. Today, so much of modern society is so other-directed, so audience-driven, and so seeker-sensitive, that much leadership is actually codependent on follower-ship, which gives rise to leaders who are really panderers, not leaders.

I think of the difference between Winston Churchill and his friend, David Lloyd George. Churchill was described “as impervious to public opinion as a diver in a bell.” Lloyd George, on the other hand, was described as so amazingly attuned to public opinion that when he was alone in the room, there was no one there. Most modern leaders—not only in politics but also, sadly, in the church—are closer to David Lloyd George than they are to Winston Churchill. But the person of calling has one audience, the audience of one. So, if one believes on the basis of conviction and conscience that the majority is wrong, it becomes necessary to challenge received opinion, to take on the majority.

**R&L: I would like to read a quotation from your book. You write, “Calling, which played a key role in the rise of modern capitalism, is one of the few things capable of guiding and restraining it now.” Could you unpack that a bit for us?**

**Guinness:** I have no problems admitting the extraordinary superiority of market capitalism; it is a remarkable engine of dynamism, fruitfulness, productivity, and so on. I question that not at all. But it is only a mechanism, and the problem comes in when people make it a source of meaning.

You see in the New Testament that those of us who are followers of Christ always have a choice. Either we love God and use money wisely and fruitfully, which is terrific, or we love money—call it Mammon—and try to use God, which is a dangerous form of idolatry. Calling helped produce the rise of capitalism; it also has the power to reintroduce a philosophical, theological, ethical notion that can be the guiding and disciplining force to channel capitalism so that it is purely creative and not destructive.

**R&L: What, then, is the relationship between markets and morality?**

**Guinness:** Unless capitalism has an ethical boundary, it will always create two problems. One is the problem of insatiability, never knowing when to stop, always wanting just a little more. The other problem—you can see this very clearly in America today—is commodification. The good society draws a line between what is and what is not for sale, but, in modern America, almost everything is up for sale, including much that should not be. We need powerful faith with strong ethics and knowledge of what is legitimate to buy and sell—that’s the market at its best—but certain things are not for buying and not for selling, and we should know why.

**R&L: It seems that you are making an important distinction—much like Pope John Paul II—between market institutions and market culture. Is that a fair description of what you are laying out?**

**Guinness:** Exactly. It takes faith, ethics, and discernment to keep a thoroughly valuable market mechanism flourishing, but in its place.
Human beings rightly puzzle about why their best-laid plans do not usually come to fruition. Further, perhaps they are still more puzzled when they consider a world—the actual world—in which at least some of their plans do work out well. How can this be? After all, human agency exists in a world in which it can subject at least some non-human things to its own purposes and in which it can persuade some human beings to follow its directions. Some correspondence evidently exists between the human mind and the things that are. Across rivers, gorges, and straits, we do build bridges that do not collapse. When we whistle to our dog, it comes running. We create neither the dog nor our ability to whistle nor the river, but we do invent the bridge. Thought arises from reality, and reality is changed by our thought connected, as it is, to our hands with which we build and to the mouth with which we whistle. We find, however, an irony in our existence, as the two above-cited passages intimate. The greatest political glory, in the case of the Roman general, is sorely tempered by the failure of moral virtue in his very home. He ended a war; he freed a city; he listened to philosophers; he beautified Athens; he planned a Roman theatre; he loved his family—all recognized characteristics of a liberal and noble man. Yet, from the classic biographer of the ancient world to the great English humorist of the twentieth century, this precarious awareness of our fallible human condition is simply present to educated men and to common folks alike.

What is called “fate,” properly considered, falls under divine providence, wherein all things—even evil, in its own way—work unto the good. Whether our propensity to find a touch of bad midst the most anticipated glories is attributed to a “supernatural agency” with Plutarch or, more amusingly, to the “lead pipe” of “Fate” with Wodehouse or to providence in revelation, we cannot avoid the fact that we must account for a human condition that sees the good suffer and the wicked prosper. Still, this same human condition recognizes oftentimes that the good is indeed good and that evil is, in fact, firmly rejected. Such is our experience.

**Freedom As First an Acquired Habit Whereby We Rule Ourselves**

The terms liberal education and free society arise out of the same source, out of the classic notion that we can and should first rule ourselves and that such rule is in our personal power. A free society means one composed of those who, in fact, do rule themselves before they talk of ruling others. The rule of others is after the manner of the self-disciplined freedom found in those who are ruled. The word free in “free society” does not refer to the capacity to do whatever we want, no matter what we want. The classic and pejorative definition of democracy arises from that undisciplined freedom or liberty that overlooks the importance of what it is we choose. Those sons of the Athenian citizens who left their parental homes without a capacity to rule themselves, as Aristotle tells us at the very end of his *Ethics*, required a political power of coercion to contain their inner disorder so that it...
would not unjustly injure others. Thus, freedom is first an inner willingness and an acquired habit whereby we rule ourselves. It does not refer to doing whatever we want but to doing what is right, worthy, and noble.

We also need to rule ourselves for some purpose. Pirates, robbers, and rakes are often “disciplined” in their own way to enable them to achieve, with a certain skill, something unworthy of man. Thus, it is possible for us to rule ourselves either for a wicked purpose or for a noble one, knowing quite well the difference between the one and the other. Moreover, it is difficult to see what a noble purpose might be if we are not first properly guided and habituated. This capacity to rule ourselves takes more than mere knowledge; it requires effort, choice, experience, and repetition of acts. The severest penalty for not ruling ourselves consists in nothing less than being unfree, that is, being unable even to see the highest things because we are too busy guiding ourselves to purposes that are unworthy.

All public disorders, and hence all unfreedom and moral slavery, are rooted in personal disorders, in wills, and in choices. Not knowing the important things is mostly a question of not willing to rule ourselves. The first notion of “liberal,” then, is that of ruling ourselves, of knowing what purposes for which we rule ourselves are good and which are not, and of disciplining ourselves in single acts actually to make good choices.

**Liberality with Property and How We Stand Toward What We Own**

A second meaning of the word *liberal* has to do with property and how we stand toward what we own. Aristotle called the virtue by which we rule over our material goods “liberality” or “generosity.” Liberality is a surprisingly important virtue as it applies to everyone, rich and poor alike—in the case of the rich, it is called munificence. One of the purposes we can choose as the principle of ruling ourselves, one of the definitions we can give ourselves of our own happiness, is precisely wealth and wealth-getting. We can use wealth wrongly or rightly, but wealth itself is a good. It is worthwhile to create it through one’s knowledge, inventiveness, and labor.

The fact that we need some material goods to live at all is simply a fact. Moreover, we ought not give away what is not ours. Private property is, in general, the best way to own and care for material possessions. Furthermore, we reveal our souls to others by how we stand in relation to our own wealth, however great or small it may be, by how we use it.

Society and personal relationships ought, then, to be a complexus of exchanges of justice and liberality, of things owed and of things freely given and freely received whereby we see the good of others and respond to it with our goods. To a society wherein everything is provided by public ownership and distribution—wherein nothing can be liberally given and only “rights” exist—we prefer one wherein most things are taken care of by ourselves, by our own virtues, and by our own property.

**Knowing Things for Their Own Sakes**

A third meaning of the word *liberal*—its most profound meaning—has to do with knowing, that is, knowing things for their own sakes. The Scriptures say that it is the truth that will make us free, but we do not “make” truth. Rather, we acknowledge it, affirming of what is that it is, and of what is not, that it is not, as Plato said. We live in a time that is antagonistic to truth, that thinks the truth is what makes us unfree. Our society is enslaved by a freedom that does not acknowledge the truth that frees it. The false notion of freedom is that we will not be bound by anything *that is*, including our own being. We must, it is said, transcend all order or reality that we do not cause. We lust after a kind of diabolic freedom that binds us to nothing but ourselves.

The free man in his actions is what Aristotle called, “a cause of himself.” But this does not mean that such a free man made the things that are. He is free when he knows. The very purpose of his mind is to become what he is not. His freedom consists in his capacity to know what is without being distracted by urgings of use, pleasure, or power. Our highest power or faculty is to know the truth of things. No society or individual can be safe if it does not possess those who are free to pursue the truth apart from political or economic coercion or opinion.

The political order and the economic order exist to make this freedom possible; they are not themselves the high-
est things and can, in fact, be its greatest hindrances. Civil and political liberties are themselves means, not ends. Even institutions designed to foster truth in freedom can become corrupt or misguided. Universities, media, religious institutions, or other voluntary societies can impose conditions that make the freedom to know the truth dangerous or difficult.

Properly speaking, liberal education includes all three forms of freedom: first, the freedom that comes when we rule ourselves, that is, when we rule for a proper good the tendencies we are given in nature; second, the freedom that comes when we use our goods and property liberally and generously for human purpose, including our own independence and dignity; and, third, the freedom to know the truth, to have the time and space in which we can know and see things for their own sakes, when we are not deflected by our own desires or by utilitarian, pleasurable, or political purposes.

**Self-Rule Is at the Heart of Civil Order**

Oftentimes we talk as if education alone will make us free or as if it is the principal element in our freedom. In a famous debate between Aristotle and Plato, it was Aristotle who pointed out that the possession or definition of knowledge does not assure us of the possession or exercise of virtue. On the other hand, virtue, even if we acquire it, is not itself its own reward but is always directed to something beyond itself. Ultimately, it is directed to the truth of being in which our happiness exists.

Liberal education in a free society always needs first to be seen in the light of virtue, of the will to rule ourselves for a worthy purpose. We are not free if we simply do whatever we want to do, whatever it is. Doing precisely whatever we want is indeed a form of slavery to our own desires or passions. Freedom in democracies often does tend to an uncontrolled notion of freedom wherein any claim that our wants or our purposes be limited or directed, even by ourselves, is looked upon as contrary to freedom.

Plato is famous for pointing out the relation between the order or disorder of our souls and the order or disorder of our societies. Machiavelli is rather infamous for the contrary idea that we must allow the prince to do either good or evil for him to be successful, that we must lower our sights because we cannot expect men to be virtuous. Rousseau instructed us that virtue and vice are products not of our wills or habits but of society and its institutions. Virtue results not of our own efforts to rule ourselves but of some institution that takes rule out of the self and places it in external law or will.

Liberal education agrees with Plato that self-rule is at the heart of civil order. It rejects Machiavelli’s indifference to the distinction of good and evil and fears Rousseau’s placing of virtue and vice in the hands of the state and its defining and coercive powers. Saint Thomas said that, as a practical rule, we should not expect more virtue than can be found in the generality of men in any society. Still, he thought we need to know what virtue is, even when we do not practice it. The role of liberal education in a free society is precisely to keep these three ideas of freedom alive among us: that we can rule ourselves; that we can be generous with our property; and that we can know the truth that alone makes us free and is the purpose for which we seek to know at all.

**The Essential Purpose of Liberal Education**

That there is some evil mixed with the most glorious deeds, that when our lives are particularly “braced in general,” we are likely to be “lead piped”—these are experiences common to our kind, the knowledge and meaning of

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The noted ecological writer Bill McKibben began a recent article for *Audubon* magazine with the following suggestion for a thought experiment:

Let’s assume, for the duration of this article, that to you trees are vertical stalks of fiber, that a forest carries no more spiritual or aesthetic value than a parking lot, that woodland creatures are uninteresting sacks of calories, and that the smell of sunbaked pine needles on a breezy June afternoon merely matches the scent that comes from those conifer-shaped air fresheners that dangle from your rearview mirror.

Let’s assume, in other words, that you’ve done something rotten and God has turned you into an economist.

McKibben does not really believe that the economist’s way of thinking is as crude as this implies, but his remarks draw a smile because economists have, in fact, acquired a reputation for knowing “the price of everything and the value of nothing”—Oscar Wilde’s definition of a cynic.

As a long-time teacher of economics and even the author of a textbook titled *The Economic Way of Thinking*, I am not about to repudiate the perspective that economists employ in explaining the world they study. It is a powerful perspective and a highly useful one. Discussion of social issues would be vastly improved and public policy would be much sounder if more people understood the economic way of thinking and put it to work.

What exactly is the economic way of thinking? It is a perspective on human decisions and social transactions. I like to summarize it as the view that emerges from the presupposition that all social phenomena result from interactions among the choices that individuals make after calculating the expected benefits and costs to themselves. This perspective is very useful when employed to explain the working of the largely impersonal network of transactions that we call the *market system* or simply the *economy*.

**Problems of Price and Value**

Markets work best when exchange transactions can be arranged and carried through at low cost. Transaction costs decline rapidly when money prices are attached to all the alternatives under consideration, because these prices provide all parties with a common denominator for comparing values. Grocers can decide much more easily what to stock, for example, and customers can decide what to buy, by comparing price tags, which enables them to cooperate very effectively. When prices are *not* attached to alternatives, cooperation becomes more difficult. How can we compare the value of the better housing people will enjoy as a result of lower timber prices with the value of the amenities preserved when a forest is left standing, without placing some kind of dollar value on the latter as well as the former? Economists have acquired their reputation for knowing a system in which relative prices are used as reflections of relative values and by trying to infer relative prices when markets do not provide any.

As long as economists use prices merely as the best available measure of values for selected purposes, the reputation is undeserved and unfair, but some people—not just professional economists—do conflate price and value. Doing that amounts to a failure to recognize a major limitation of the economic way of thinking. The Gross Domestic Product as measured by government statisticians is not identical to the Gross National Welfare. Some of what contributes to the former makes no contribution to total welfare or even makes it less. If the crime rate increases and homeowners buy security systems, the price of the security systems gets added to the Gross Domestic Product. If air pollution requires houses to be painted more often, the prices of the additional paint and painters’ services are counted in the GDP. If a man divorces his wife and subsequently hires a housekeeper, the wages of the housekeeper will contribute to the GDP, although the unpriced work of the wife did not.

Moreover, the fact that one person was willing to pay a higher price for a good than another does not prove that the first valued the good more highly. The first may simply have valued money less than the other *at the margin*, which means, given the relative amounts of money and other goods that each commanded when making decisions.

Most economists are so afraid of contaminating their analysis with value judgements that they will freely admit, even insist, that economic theory cannot decide whether one set of arrangements is better or more in the public...
interest than another. Many of these same economists fail to see, however, that the economic way of thinking also cannot determine whether one set of arrangements is more efficient than another. Claims that rent controls or protective tariffs promote inefficiency, if they mean anything definite at all, mean that rent controls and protective tariffs reduce the size of the potential Gross Domestic Product. That may be an interesting and important claim, but it is not as significant as the claim that they are inefficient. And the latter claim has no foundation in economic theory.

Efficiency refers ultimately to valuations. (The term technical efficiency is a meaningless combination of words.) Because prices and values are not the same, the economic way of thinking cannot pronounce on the relative efficiency of alternative arrangements. It is often said that rush-hour urban traffic is inefficient because it is made up predominantly of single passenger vehicles. That is an unsupported claim. Those who drive alone rather than forming a car pool or taking the bus are implicitly showing that they place a higher value on the benefits relative to the costs of driving alone than of any available alternative. For people with the appropriate values, the most efficient way to commute to work could be in solemn procession, carrying candles and chanting psalms.

Effective Coordination with Millions of Others

The economic way of thinking has at least one other major limitation, a limitation that is also closely related to the connection between economic theory and market systems. The problem begins with the fact that economic theory is a defense of market systems. While many, perhaps most, economists would vigorously dispute that last sentence, they are being disingenuous. Economic theory shows how millions of people, pursuing the infinitely varied projects that interest them, coordinate their activities effectively with millions of other people, although they know next to nothing about the projects that interest those other people. The economic way of thinking shows how social processes that look like recipes for chaos (and that have often been so described) produce actual cooperation and advance the purposes of those who participate in these processes. Adam Smith invoked a semi-theological metaphor to characterize this process: the invisible hand. Because economic theory explains the working of the invisible hand, it is in a very basic sense a defense of market systems. It does not defend every aspect of such systems, but it certainly tends strongly to demonstrate to anyone willing to pay attention that markets work a lot better than most people suppose and that proposed substitutes for market systems, such as socialism, are the true recipes for chaos.

However, the economic way of thinking exaggerates the achievements of markets by overlooking their subversive effect on other forms of human relationship. Adam Smith noted that in a society characterized by extensive specialization, people stand “at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes.” That certainly describes us. We depend upon multitudes of other people, most of whom we do not know and never think about, to provide the food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and other goods that enable us to live in comfort and health.

This dependence on others has one feature that deserves more attention than it usually receives: The dependence is characterized by extraordinary freedom because we rarely have to depend on specific others. If we do not like the product or the terms on which it is offered, we can take our business to someone else. We have lots of choices, and choice means freedom for each of us: genuine independence despite our dependence on “the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes.”

Communities of Exceptional Thinness

That is not an unmixed good. It produces a society in which people barely know, if they even know at all, most of the people with whom they interact. The market functions very well even when the transactions that make it up are between people with no personal knowl-

Market systems and the economic way of thinking are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the nurture of a free, prosperous, and just society.

—Paul Heyne
It is not that market transactions are inherently impersonal but that markets have so extended the range of our transactions that we necessarily do most of our exchanging with people whom we cannot possibly know personally.

Reflect for a moment on the role of money in this scheme. Most of us feel vaguely uneasy selling to friends or buying from friends for money; it seems somehow cold and impersonal. At Christmastime we give our friends gifts that we have taken the trouble to choose, and we are not dependent on them because it is so much easier to consult the Yellow Pages when we find ourselves in need of assistance.

Even that is not all bad. How many of us want to live in a village where people all know one another? We have become strongly attached to the privacy that the market system makes possible. But we do incur costs for this: crime, isolation, loneliness, anomie, a sense of impotence in the face of social problems, festering inequities that both market and government are too impersonal to overcome. While some of us are in a position to belittle these costs, they are serious burdens for others.

The costs are unanticipated side effects of markets, part of the price we pay for the enormous wealth and personal liberty that markets create. They are not effects of the economist’s way of thinking, but the economic way of thinking has proved itself surprisingly blind to these costs, which is why I have emphasized them in discussing limitations of the economic way of thinking.

The economic way of thinking shows how social processes that look like recipes for chaos produce actual cooperation and advance the purposes of those who participate in these processes.

The corollary is that money creates communities in which very little is actually shared and that these communities, through their effectiveness in enabling us to further the projects in which we are interested, become the principal communities in which we participate. Monetary exchange so dominates our social transactions that we have come to reside primarily in communities of exceptional thinness. We cannot love our neighbors because we do not even know their names, which we have never had occasion to learn because we are in no way dependent on them, and we are not dependent on them because it is so much easier to consult

The operative word is displace, not replace. The market cannot be a complete substitute for the family, but it can and does provide family members with attractive opportunities that make participation in family activities less important. Time spent eating dinner together becomes too costly to prolong when the television set is calling.

Consider how the automobile, a favorite gift of the market system, has altered the role of churches in the lives of many who think of themselves as faithful “churchgoing people.” The mobility created by the automobile enables people to worship more easily at a church that suits them, which often means a church that imposes on them no uncomfortable demands and where they need not stay long enough to develop any serious responsibilities.

And who really needs the neighborhood? Why concern oneself with the neighborhood school when an efficient real-estate market makes it so easy to transfer residence to where the neighborhood school is more satisfactory?

The market is a faithful servant in America today, providing more and more of the good things that we want. That is no reason to cripple it. It is reason, however, to think more carefully about what we want.

**Paul Heyne, Ph.D., is lecturer in economics at the University of Washington and author of the widely used economics textbook, The Economic Way of Thinking (eighth edition, Prentice Hall).**
In 1991, Eerdmans published a revision of Craig Gay’s Ph.D. thesis. Entitled *With Liberty and Justice for Whom?*, the book’s subtitle conveyed its scope: *The Recent Evangelical Debate Over Capitalism*. Gay’s book was marked by common social science preoccupations—the assumption that “interests” determine convictions, for example—and did not always explicate the ideas of those it described in terms that satisfied their authors, but there is no other source available that comprehensively describes the debates then current. The usual suspects filled the pages of the book. On what Gay called “the left” were Jim Wallis, Danny Collum, Arthur Gish, John Alexander, and Ronald J. Sider, some of whom were beginning to incorporate Marxist thinking into their theology. On the right—what Gay called “the defenders of capitalism”—he included people like Ronald Nash, John Jefferson Davis, Herbert Schlossberg, P. J. Hill, and E. Calvin Beisner. And in the center, “the mainstream,” he gave us mainly representatives from the Dutch Reformed tradition like Bob Goudzwaard and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Anyone interested in what evangelical thinkers were saying about economics in the decade-and-a-half after 1977 can go no place other than Gay’s book to find out what was happening.

First Edition Was a Wake-Up Call

I say “1977” because that was the year Ronald Sider published *Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger*, the original book of which the one under review is the fourth version. The evangelical world, active in evangelism and in health and relief ministries, was largely oblivious to structural arrangements that made widespread poverty seem endemic, almost inevitable. Sider’s book was a wake-up call, striking at the complacency that was so common. It swept through evangelical colleges and seminaries and turned masses of students and teachers against the capitalist systems that Sider identified as one of the main agencies of worldwide poverty.

Arrayed against Sider’s approach in the early years was almost nothing, until David Chilton wrote *Productive Christians in an Age of Guilt Manipulators*, published in 1981. When Sider published a new edition of *Rich Christians*, it was ostensibly to answer his critics, but Chilton’s name was conspicuously absent from the book. Chilton answered Sider’s second edition with his own new edition of *Productive Christians* (1982), and Sider’s third with his own third (1985). Now that the twentieth-anniversary edition of *Rich Christians* is here, we look in vain for a response from Chilton, who died young a couple of years ago.

Were Chilton still alive, he might not think it worthwhile to respond to Sider at all, since this is a different book from an author who is much changed. Sider is a new man.

Sider a new man? That’s more or less what he says. He has learned a lot of economics in the last twenty years. In the struggle of economic ideas, communism has lost and capitalism has won, and deservedly so, for the “market-oriented economy” is better, and better for poor people. Sider is especially impressed by the economic progress of some of the Asian countries that have adopted market economies. He knows the poor are not necessarily morally superior to others. Decentralized economic decisions empower people. The causes of poverty are complex. He now knows that the poverty of poor countries may be causally related to the tyrants who rule them. He now knows that the Jubilee of Leviticus 25 was not a matter of government-mandated redistribution.

Former Ideas in New Clothing

Yet, the old Sider is still with us, often so well-disguised that he himself sometimes does not appear to recognize his former ideas in new clothing. He knows that the relative income figures of rich and poor countries are misleading but still uses them. He sees that faulty worldviews have something to do with poverty, but he quotes Myrdal on colonialism and poverty as if that were not true. He now has the meaning of the Jubilee approximately right, but he sees in it “no hint … of a sacred law of supply and demand that operates independently of biblical ethics…. It is hard to...
see how he can recognize that the value of the land is determined by the number of harvests that are transferred to the receiver without wondering how the value of each harvest is to be determined. He will never be able to account for it if he thinks that perceptions of supply and demand have nothing legitimate to do with the setting of those prices. (That “sacred law” he speaks of is, regrettably, a cheap shot).

Sider lauds the expansion of market economies as helping the poor but seems to think it inevitable that this will lead to “pervasive cultural decline”; thus, he confuses markets with the faults of some who participate in them. He still is baffled about the workings of the free market that he lauds, presuming that if we buy an unnecessary suit, or drink a beer or eat a hamburger made with grain that could have become bread, we are taking food out of the mouths of the poor. He evidently thinks that if the beer and hamburger markets dry up because people stop consuming these products, employment those more statist countries are powder kegs; indeed, as I write, France is beginning to explode with frustration.

In at least one respect this edition of the book is worse than its predecessors, containing a long, completely one-sided—the alarmist side—section on the environment. Sider cites the highly controversial 1995 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as if that settled the global warming issue. In fact, the controversy is as bristly as it ever was. I think Sider’s understanding of environmentalism is now roughly at the place his understanding of economics was in 1977, and in the years to come he will again have considerable back-tracking to do.

**Stewardship Mandate in Light of the Biblical Ethic**

That example suggests the main problem with Sider’s approach. He still reaches conclusions based on an insufficient knowledge base, and therefore is unable to judge his sources adequately. Thus, in his index we find Gunnar Myrdal, but not P. T. Bauer; Donald Hay, but not P. J. Hill; Arthur Simon, but not Julian Simon; Lester Brown, but not Fred Singer; Dom Helder Camara, but not E. Calvin Beisner or Amy Sherman. And especially not David Chilton. That tendentious selectivity is enough to account for the incoherence of this book. *Rich Christians* is full of, “On the one hand this and on the other hand that,” but without coming to any integrated conclusion that accounts for both. What could be only a series of paradoxes, susceptible to resolution, remain in this treatment irritating contradictions.

The strength of this twentieth-anniversary edition of *Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger* is the same as the strength of its predecessors: It forces all but the most obdurate of Christians to face the issue of their own stewardship in the light of the demands of the biblical ethic. To that extent, its influence is salutary. The evangelical college I attended forty years ago was full of Eisenhower Republicans, secure in their complacent conservatism. It took a book like this to blast them out of it, and Sider deserves the credit for doing it.

Its weaknesses, however, left his readers vulnerable to the guilt-inducing delusions of collectivist thinking. This edition shows how much Sider has learned in the last few years about the potential that market economies have for preserving liberty and expanding economic well-being, but its preoccupations provide no coherent way for people to come to an understanding of their own responsibilities in the light of the stewardship mandate. Those who follow its precepts will give more generously to the poor and perhaps eat fewer hamburgers. They will think kind thoughts about the free market, but will learn from Sider neither why markets produce so much benefit nor how vulnerable they are to ignorance and malevolence wielding power. Such readers may be unable to do more than watch complacently if the market is forced to the wall by statist ideologues.

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Herbert Schlossberg, Ph.D., is a project director at the Fieldstead Institute and the author of several books, including *Idols for Destruction: Christian Faith and its Confrontation with American Society* (Crossway). He is a contributing editor to Religion & Liberty.
**If Aristotle Ran General Motors**  
*The New Soul of Business*  
by Thomas V. Morris  
Review by Harry C. Veryser

Very rarely does a book of extraordinary insight, expressed in understandable terms, appear. This is one of those books. In it, Thomas Morris applies to everyday business conditions not only the wisdom of Aristotle but also the thoughts of other great philosophers. In doing so, he demonstrates that the ethical way in business helps the firm, the individual, and the economy in general achieve their goals.

Following Aristotle, Morris first observes that each business organization is essentially comprised of people, and, so, the propriety of their relationships determines the success or failure of their organization. This is unusual for a modern book on business ethics, for bookstore shelves are loaded down with so-called business ethics texts that emphasize only the social context of modern enterprise. Firms are constantly derided for not caring about the environment, the poor, and the like. In contrast, Morris recognizes that each person possesses both an individual life and a life of relationships with others. Ethics, therefore, has something to say about the improvement of the individual person in addition to issues of social concern.

The book’s outline follows the four philosophical transcendentals—truth, beauty, goodness, and unity—and Morris demonstrates how the conscious recognition of each helps an organization operate with excellence and its people live happier lives. These transcendentals are helpful guides because each corresponds to a different dimension of human experience. As he explains, the intellectual dimension aims at truth, the aesthetic dimension at beauty, the moral dimension at goodness, and the spiritual dimension at unity. In Morris’s words, “I have become convinced that these four dimensions of experience, and these four foundations of excellence, provide us with the key to both rediscovering personal satisfaction at work and reinventing corporate spirit in our time. They are the key to sustainable corporate excellence because they are the foundations of corporate fulfillment, and they have that status because they are the deepest touchstones for ultimate individual fulfillment and happiness.”

The first section deals with truth—not unusual for a follower of Saint Thomas and Aristotle, since both teach that the beginning of any endeavor starts with the recognition of being, or truth.

Truth, Morris points out, is the foundation of all human partnerships, and business is essentially human partnerships.

But truth, though foundational, is not enough. Human beings must also have something attractive to motivate them; hence, the need for beauty. Morris argues that workplaces that reflect beauty are more productive and have happier employees. Further, beauty raises the consciousness of employees and gives them a sense of being cared about. Providing a beautiful workplace, however, is an essentially passive activity, though it will transfer itself into the beauty of performance. As Morris points out, “In the act of the performance itself … there is a kind of beauty that can be experienced only by the performer, from the kinesthetic sense of her own movement to the inner awareness of artistic ‘making’ as the ancient Greeks might have said. The relevance of this to the business world is extremely important.” It is this application of both active and passive beauty to the commercial world that transforms business into a beautiful act. In Morris’s words, “The structures of business are, then, some of our most basic tools for the performance art of life. This is the beauty of business.”

Doing beautiful things in a beautiful environment, though, is still not sufficient. Human beings must be convinced of the essential goodness of what they are doing. According to Morris, “When people work in conditions of perceived unfairness and unkindness, they fall into a self-protective mode. Like turtles, they crawl into their shells and hide. They are not motivated to take positive risks, to dig deep inside to discover all their talents and bring those talents to bear in creative ways on the challenges of corporate business.” Businesses that pursue goodness build that most essential component of all human relationships—trust. Without trust, business relationships collapse into suspicion, which prevents the collaborative partnerships that are the foundation of business activity, and unethical practices prevent business activities from working toward any lasting good.

Yet, the true, the beautiful, and the good are still not enough. Human beings must perceive a sense of wholeness and that they are part of some greater thing—in other words, unity, the spiritual dimension of work. As Morris points out, the heart of spirituality is connectedness, and the aim of connectedness is unity. Interestingly, Morris shows that this concept of unity leads to the idea of the worth and value of the human individual. Uniqueness and
union are really the two sides of the same coin: “By respecting and nurturing the twin needs for a sense of uniqueness and a feeling of union among those around us, we help ourselves as well as our associates to attain that form of corporate spirit that is the wellspring of happiness, fulfillment, and quality of the highest order in everything that we do.”

After reading it for review, I assigned If Aristotle Ran General Motors as required reading to my business ethics class, taught every summer for the graduate students at Walsh College. It has proven to be one of the best parallel texts to the Nicomachean Ethics that I have found. The strength of thinkers like Aristotle and Aquinas is that they stress principles that students can, in turn, apply to everyday situations. Sadly, it is often difficult for the contemporary student to understand these authors.

Morris’s book is a real solution to this problem. He displays a wonderful knack for presenting difficult philosophical concepts in modern language, which energizes the student’s understanding of them. For example, in discussing the interrelationship of human action and happiness, Morris helpfully explains that happiness should be seen as an activity rather than a static concept. His demonstration of the importance for business practice of what Edmund Burke called the “moral imagination” is, likewise, quite useful. Finally, he masterfully shows the student the importance of the formation of habits and their role in the art of living well—one of the primary lessons of the Nicomachean Ethics. For students of any age, there are few better companions to Aristotle, Aquinas, and the other great thinkers of the past than If Aristotle Ran General Motors.

**Two Steps Ahead of the Thought Police, Second Edition**

*John Leo*

Transaction Publishers, 1998

345 pp. Paper: $19.95

A satirist in the tradition of Mark Twain and H. L. Mencken, John Leo has been long entertaining his readers by pillorying the worst excesses of the Political Correctness movement while lifting high the standard of common sense. This collection of editorials is Leo at his best—bitingly funny and with a keen moral edge.

**A History of the American People**

*Paul Johnson*


1103 pp. Hardcover: $35.00

It is tempting to call any work by Paul Johnson “magisterial,” but considering the authority and mastery with which he writes, the term may be hackneyed, but it is fitting. His latest offering, A History of the American People, is surely no disappointment.

For Johnson, the history of America is “the greatest of all human adventures.” It is the story of men and women “thrown together by fate in that swirling maelstrom of history which has produced the most remarkable people the world has ever seen.” And Johnson tells that story with skill and vividness.

His main project is to shed light on what he thinks are the three fundamental issues of American history. First is the question of whether the American nation has been able to atone for the “injustices of its origins” through the strength of its moral purpose. Second, he inquires into whether, in the formation of a nation, it is possible to blend high ideals with stern ambition. Third, he wonders whether the America people have proven good on their claim to be “exemplars for humanity.”

Johnson’s questions are remarkable, for they presuppose that the writing of history should be done in the light of moral principles but without the politicized cant so prevalent among professional historians. He does, though, make no claim to hide his opinions and offers his moral judgment freely. Thus, it is not difficult to find conclusions with which to quibble—some quite problematic—but Johnson is to be commended for producing this passionate and, ultimately, optimistic account of the American adventure.

**The City of Man**

*Pierre Manent*

Princeton University Press, 1998

248 pp. Hardcover: $24.95

The author’s primary objective in this challenging work is to explore the question, “What do we really mean when we use the word man today?” The asking of such a question, according to Manent, is hindered by the fact that the project of philosophy since the Renaissance has been to reject any concept of human nature based on nature. Modern thought has insisted instead that human beings are able to constantly recreate their identities; thus, any universal conception of human nature remains, for modern man, inaccessible. In the course of his exploration of the Western intellectual and political condition, Manent offers a remarkable survey of the best books and thinkers of modernity.

— Gregory Dunn
The Role of Responsibility in a Free Society

One way to think about the role of responsibility in a free society is to imagine a society where freedom is absent. Writers from ancient times have drawn sketches of just this sort of society. These imagined Utopias—conjured up by Plato, Thomas More, and the medieval monk Campanella—have all been similar in their broad outlines. Property is held in common and distributed by the magistrates according to need. Children are raised collectively. There is no freedom of association, freedom of education, or freedom to enter or exit the community. And since individual decision-making is forbidden, developing a sense of responsibility is a moot point.

Our ancestors enjoyed reading such thought experiments for amusement, enchantment, and philosophic reflection, but they were never considered plausible political programs. Until this century.

Between these earlier Utopian visions and us today stands the imposing figure of Marx. His speculations must be put in a different category from the older Utopias because he was not performing a mental experiment but, rather, advancing a political platform. Because of our tragic experience of the ghastly totalitarian regimes of this century, we know all too well that such schemes as Marx’s result not in Utopia, but in chaos and darkness. The end of freedom is, by necessity, the end of responsibility, and the end of responsibility is the end of civilization.

By assuming responsibility for ever-expanding sectors of society, government renders the rest of society less responsible. Charles Murray put his able finger on this problem when he wrote that “the most important change in social policy during the last thirty years” was “Not the amount of money government spent. Not how much was wasted. Not even the ways in which the government hurt those it intended to help. Ultimately, the most important effect of government’s metastasizing role was to strip daily life of much of the stuff of life”—that “stuff of life” being, “feeding the hungry, succoring the sick, comforting the sad, nurturing the children, tending the elderly, and chastising sinners.”

To make individuals more responsible, we must ask government to assume less control over their lives, for resolution to social problems is more often achieved, not by experiments in the uses of power, but by relations characterized by virtue and its necessary predicate, liberty.

Intelligent discussion about liberty and responsibility requires an examination of the role of coercion in social relationships, and it is on this score that we are required to look at the extent to which government has assumed, or has been permitted to assume, responsibility in areas of life that were previously under the domain of civil society. It would be a mistake to construe this project as essentially anti-government; it is no more anti-government than a lifeguard is anti-water. When swimmers behave irresponsibly around water, or when the undertow of the tide is, unknown to the swimmer, strong and deadly, then it is time for the lifeguard to sound the alarm.

When observing its proper tasks—national security, enforcement of contracts, defense of property, and, above all, protection of the right to life—government is a good thing. But to say government is a necessary institution is not to say it is the morally primary one. We cannot achieve heaven here on earth, nor should we try. We can, however, recapture freedom and a traditional understanding of responsibility. If this is to be done, though, the crucial instruments of change will not be the functionaries of the state, but the father whose faithfulness to his family forms the moral tenor of succeeding generations and the mother whose reverence for and nourishing of life ensures the very existence mankind’s future.

Fr. Sirico is cofounder and president of the Acton Institute. This essay is adapted from his remarks at the Heritage Foundation’s “Leadership for America” Dinner in Grand Rapids, Michigan, June 6, 1998.
“Liberty and good government do not exclude each other; and there are excellent reasons why they should go together. Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end.”

—Lord Acton—